Amgen's retrospective sortie into personalized Vectibix treatment poses some difficult questions for regulators concerning the oversight of companion diagnostics.
I
t's not often that the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and European Medicines Agency (EMEA) look at the same data and come to different conclusions. It's even more unusual when they each change their minds in the light of new data, but remain at odds with one another. This, in essence, is what has happened to Amgen's 'fully human' monoclonal antibody (mAb) Vectibix (panitumumab) targeting the epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR). The FDA approved Vectibix for advanced, chemotherapy-refractory colorectal cancer, whereas the EMEA turned it down. But then the EMEA gave the green light for the same mAb with a diagnostic test for mutations in the KRAS gene, whereas the FDA rejected it. What is going on?
Part of the problem is that the clinical data for Vectibix are equivocal at best. In the original phase 3 open-label trial, only 8% of metastatic colorectal cancer patients who had progressed after chemotherapy responded to the drug, and even then survival was prolonged by only a few weeks. The drug also failed to improve overall survival compared with the best supportive care (chemotherapy). Nevertheless, the FDA granted Amgen accelerated approval for Vectibix in September 2006, characterizing the trial results as "clinically modest, but highly significant."
The EMEA was more skeptical. When presented with the same data, its concerns were about the trial design and the mAb's efficacy. Its glass-halfempty verdict on the drug was that "Vectibix only had a very small effect in increasing the time until the disease got worse or the patient died." Last May, the EMEA recommended against approval, stating that the benefits of Vectibix did not outweigh its risks.
From a safety standpoint, as with other drugs that target EGFR, Vectibix is fairly toxic. Its label warns that 89% of patients receiving the mAb experience dermatologic toxicity and acne, 12% report severe toxicity and 1% of patients suffer major infusion reactions. A year ago, these toxicities forced Amgen to discontinue another late-stage trial, which the company hoped would establish Vectibix as a first-line treatment for patients with colorectal cancer. Instead, the trial showed that the combination of the mAb with chemotherapy and Genentech's Avastin (bevacizumab, which binds VEGF) increased adverse events and was less efficacious than controls.
That left Vectibix as a second-line, if not third-line, cancer treatment in the US, with a nonexistent market in Europe. Hardly the blockbuster rival to ImClone's chimeric monoclonal, Erbitux (cetuximab).
It was then that Amgen retrospectively genotyped patients' tumors to try to make a more compelling case for Vectibix. The markers they looked at were seven mutations in codons 12 and 13 of the KRAS gene. KRAS is involved in one of two major intracellular pathways involved in epithelial cancers, the KRAS-RAF-MEK-MAPK pathway, which regulates transcription, cell cycle progression and cell proliferation and which is blocked by EGFR inhibitors. Patients with certain KRAS mutations are known to be resistant to Erbitux and to small-molecule inhibitors of EGFR, such as Iressa (gefitinib) and Tarceva (erlotinib).
Happily for Amgen, the retrospective analysis showed a marked difference in response rate. Patients with mutated KRAS gained no benefit at all from the mAb, whereas the group with wild-type KRAS achieved a 17% response rate to Vectibix and a much greater increase in progression-free survival.
The EMEA's Scientific Advisory Group on Oncology found the findings "interesting" but only "exploratory;" nevertheless, the EMEA opted to approve Vectibix in tandem with a diagnostic because the combination gave physicians options for informed decisions about treatments for patients who had not responded to previous regimens. The approval was contingent on the availability of a test kit and on Amgen's agreeing to provide prospective data on the biomarker from two current large phase 3 trials of Vectibix due to finish later this year.
Convincing the FDA has proven an altogether harder task. The US agency regards all retrospective biomarker data strictly as hypothesis generating. This is sound: the literature is replete with poorly validated biomarker associations. Furthermore, such analyses can be compromised by sampling bias (imbalances between numbers of control and treated patients) and selective data dredging. Several FDA officials have stated that prospective studies are an absolute requirement for biomarker claims on a drug's label; getting such claims on the label is often a requisite for reimbursement.
There are counterarguments, of course. First, in this case, Amgen's analysis used both a sample size similar to the original trial (427 compared with 463 patients) and the original pre-specified endpoints. What's more, Vectibix is already on the US market, and the use of the KRAS marker has a compelling clinical significance, a strong biological rationale and saves the expense ($100,000 for a year's treatment) and side-effects of futile therapy. In cases like this, in which the test merely excludes nonresponding patients, is the extra level of regulation really necessary?
One interim solution would be for the FDA to create an alternative regulatory pathway to be used when there is little or no safety risk attached to the diagnostic. The drug-diagnostic combination could be given provisional approval based on retrospective data if the endpoints used in the biomarker analysis were pre-specified, the sampling was non-biased and the sponsor agreed to provide prospective data later.
By adopting such a system, the FDA could send a strong signal to drug makers to carry out more patient segmentation. As the Feature on p. 509 shows, thus far progress in adoption of patient stratification has been painfully slow. And drug makers are often reticent about launching prospective biomarker trials for new drugs when so much remains unknown about the effects of these drugs on biology.
The FDA should be more flexible in considering well-designed retrospective analyses of existing clinical data. Sometimes, to propel a field forward, it's worth taking a look back. 
